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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WESTERN COATING, INC., an Oregon
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GIBBONS and REED COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; and AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 880289

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under the provisions of Article
VIII, Section 3, Utah Constitution, and 78-2-2(3)(j) , Utah Code
Annotated.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellant, Western Coating, sued Gibbons and Reed Company,
as principal, and American Insurance Company, as surety, on a
payment bond furnished to the Utah Department of Transportation
in connection with a road-building project, for the value of
reinforcing steel sold to defendant Continental-Hagen, a supplier
to a subcontractor of Gibbons and Reed.
cross-claimed against Continental-Hagen.

Gibbons and Reed
A default judgment was

taken by Western Coating against Continental-Hagen.

Thereafter,

on motion of Gibbons and Reed and American Insurance, the court
granted, summary judgment dismissing Western Coating's action

against them, and Gibbons and Reed's cross-claim against
Continental-Hagen.

Western Coating filed a timely appeal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether Western Coating, a supplier to a supplier to a subcontractor of Gibbons and Reed Company was a beneficiary of the
payment bond provided to the Utah Department of Transportation.
CONTROLLING STATUTE
The controlling statute is Section 63-56-38, Utah Code Annotated, a part of the Utah Procurement Code.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with the statement of facts of Western
Coating except the statement that the bond was for the protection
of "those supplying labor and materials to the project," the
extent of that protection being the issue in this case.

An addi-

tional fact, not mentioned by Western Coating, is that all sums
that were due to Gibbons and Reed's subcontractor, Pacheco &
Martinez, were paid (R.38, par.11, R.60).
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT
Between 1963 and 1980, when the Utah Procurement Code was
adopted, the requirements for payment bonds on public construction contracts were set out in Section 14-1-6, Utah Code Annotated.

The section was repealed in 1980 when a modified
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provision relating to bonding for public contracts was enacted
and incorporated into the Utah Procurement Code as Section
63-56-38.
The Utah Procurement Code provision made substantial changes
in language, indicating an intention on the part of the Utah legislature to limit the class of beneficiaries of payment bonds.
Prior to adoption of Section 14-1-6, federal decisions under the
Miller Act (40 U.S.C. §S

270a-270d) did not protect every person

who furnished labor and materials for a public project, but only
those who had a contract with the contractor or the contractor's
subcontractor.

The federal law on payment bonds was well known

prior to adoption of the procurement code, and the language used
in the procurement code suggests that the code provisions were
meant to have a scope similar to that of the Miller Act. Although
the federal decisions are not controlling, they are very persuasive with respect to legislative intent.
The inability of a contractor to anticipate the claims that
it may have to pay if the bonding statute reaches too far, and
the fact that the contractor's property is not improved differentiate bond cases from mechanics1 lien cases.
Although a few other states have interpreted payment bond
statutes as protecting lower tier suppliers, the wording of state
statutes varies, as does their legislative history, and Utah
- 3-

courts should attempt to find to the intention of the Utah legislature under accepted rules of statutory construction.
ARGUMENT
I.
Interpretation of the Miller Act by the Federal
Courts, Though Not Conclusive, is Persuasive and Should
be Followed.
The federal Miller Act (40 U.S.C. SS 270a-270d) was enacted
in 1935, and in 1944 the United States Supreme Court in Clifford
L. MacEvoy Co. v^ United States, 322 U.S. 102, 64 S.Ct. 890, 88
L.Ed. 1163, placed a significant limitation on the types of suppliers who are beneficiaries of Miller Act payment bonds. The
issue presented in MacEvoy was whether a person supplying material to a materialman of a government contractor could recover on
the payment bond, and the United States Supreme Court said he
could not, noting that although the payment bond was ostensibly
for the protection of "all persons supplying labor and material
in the prosecution of the work" the notice provision of Section
2(a) limited rights under the payment bond to (1) those materialmen, laborers, and subcontractors who dealt directly with prime
contractors, and (2) those materialmen, laborers and subcontractors who, lacking express or implied contractual relationship
with prime contractors, had direct contractual relationships with
subcontractors of prime contractors.
- 4-

The court said that to allow those in more remote relationships to recover on the bond would be contrary to the clear language of the proviso and the express will of Congress, and would
lead to the absurd result of requiring notice from persons in
direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor, but not
requiring notice from more remote claimants. The court observed
that in the established usage of the building trades, a subcontractor is one who performs for, and takes from the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of
the original contract, thus excluding ordinary laborers and
materialmen.
After MacEvoyf a large majority of the United States courts
of appeal and district courts took the position that suppliers or
subcontractors of sub-subcontractors were not covered by the provisions of the bond.

See Annotation, Protection Under Bond Given

Under Miller Act [40 U.S.C., §§

270a-270e3 of One Supplying

Labor or Material to One Other than the Prime Contractor or his
Immediate Subcontractor, 79 A.L.R.2d 852.
Utah's Section 14-1-6, adopted 19 years after the decision
in MacEvoyf contained language essentially the same as that
relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in deciding
MacEvoy.

Compare the following excerpts:
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Miller Act [40 U.S.C. S 270b]
Every person who has furnished labor or material in the
prosecution of the work provided for in such contract, in
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this act
and who has not been paid in full therefor before the expiration of a period of ninety days after the day on which the
last of the labor was done or performed by him or material
was furnished or supplied by him for which such claim is
made, shall have the right to sue on such payment bond for
the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of
institution of such suit and to prosecute said action to
final execution and judgment for the sum or sums justly due
him: Provided, however, That any person having direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor but no contractual relationship express or implied with the contractor
furnishing said payment bond shall have a right of action
upon the said payment bond upon giving written notice to
said contractor within ninety days from the date on which
such person did or performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the last of the material for which such
claim is made, * * * .
Little Miller Act [14-1-6, U.C.A. 1953]
Every claimant who has furnished labor or material in the
prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this act,
and who has not been paid in full therefor before the expiration of a period of ninety days after the day on which the
last of the labor was done or performed by him or material
was furnished or supplied by him for which such claim is
made, shall have the right to sue on such payment bond for
the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of
institution of such suit and to prosecute such action to
final judgment for the sum or sums justly due him and have
execution thereon; provided, however, that any such claimant
having a direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor of the contractor furnishing such payment bond but no
contractual relationship expressed or implied with such contractor shall not have a right of action upon such payment
bond unless he has given written notice to such contractor
within ninety days from the date on which such claimant performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the
last of the material for which such claim is made,
*

•

*
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It is clear that the foregoing provisions of the earlier
Utah statute were copied from the federal legislation, the only
material change being use of "claimant" instead of "person," and
it is clear that the interpretation of the Miller Act by the
United States Supreme Court should be followed even if 14-1-6 had
not been replaced by 63-56-38.

Because of the similarity of the

language and the fact that MacEvoy was decided 19 years before
adoption of 14-1-6, the federal interpretations of the Miller Act
prior to 1963 should be very persuasive in interpreting the Utah
provision.
In City of Weippe v. Yarno, 96 Ida. 319, 528 P.2d 201, 203
(1974), the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to determine
whether items furnished for a construction project were "materials" within the meaning of the Idaho statute based on the Miller
Act.

The court relied on prior federal decisions, saying:
A statute which is adopted from another jurisdiction,
including federal statutes adopted by a state, will be presumed to be adopted with the prior construction placed upon
it by the courts of the other jurisdictions.
The case was followed by the United States Court of Appeals

of the Ninth Circuit in Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270,
1279 (1978), a diversity case.
Another question of statutory construction was before the
Arizona Supreme Court in Western Asbestos Co. v. TGK Construction
- 7 -

Co., Inc., 121 Ariz. 388, 590 P.2d 927, 929 (1979).

The court

said:
• * * * w e note that our statute is modeled after the federal statute, the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. S 270a, et seg., and
decisions concerning notice under the federal statute are
persuasive in interpreting our so-called "Little Miller
Act."
We have found no Utah cases dealing with the effect to be
given to the Miller Act in interpreting Utah's public bonding
statute, but the court has considered and relied upon federal
decisions in construing Utah statutes based upon the federal
labor and tax statutes.

Southeast Furniture Co. v. Industrial

Commission, 100 Utah 154, 111 P.2d 153, 154 (1941); American
Foundry and Machine Co. v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 105 Utah
83, 141 P.2d 390, 391 (1943); and Bennett Association v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 19 Utah 2d 108, 426 P.2d 812, 814 (1967).
In Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903, 904
(Utah 1984), this court stated:
We recognize that when the legislature adopts a statute
from another state, the presumption is that the legislature
is familiar with that statefs judicial interpretations and
statutes and intends to adopt them also.
The court, however, declined to follow Wisconsin comparative negligence decisions, pointing out that the rule does not apply in
certain instances, as where the adopting legislature has made
material changes in the statute, or where construction of the
- 8-

statute by the other state was subsequent to its adoption by the
Utah legislature —

circumstances not present here.

The Colorado, New Mexico and Massachusetts cases cited by
Western Coating should not be taken as suggesting a different
approach to application of Miller Act decisions.

In South-Way

Construction Co. v. Adams City Service, 169 Colo. 513, 458 P.2d
250, 251 (1969), the Colorado court was dealing with a statute
that had been enacted not later than 1923, 12 years before the
Miller Act and had been construed by the Colorado court in 1925.
Peters v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 389 N.E.2d 63 (Mass.
1979) refused to limit the term "subcontractor" to one having a
contractual relationship with the contractor, but this was
because of the 1910 case of Friedman v. County of Hampden, 204
Mass. 494, 501-502 (1910), and a series of cases that had followed it in which "subcontractor" was defined as "one who has
entered into a contract, express or implied, for the performance
of an act with a person who has already contracted for its performance."

The Massachusetts statute was not based on the Miller

Act, and a long line of Massachusetts cases had made no distinction between tiers of subcontractors, sub-subcontractors and
materialmen.

In State of New Mexico ex. rel. W. M. Carroll & Co.

v. K.L. House Construction Co., Inc., 99 N.M. 186, 656 P.2d 236
(1982), the New Mexico Supreme Court decided that a third-tier
- 9-

supplier was entitled to protection under New Mexico's Little
Miller Act.

One of the sections of the New Mexico statute, how-

ever, had language, unlike anything in the Utah statutes, which
suggested a legislative intent to satisfy "all just claims" for
materials and supplies furnished to the contractor or any subcontractor.

It is recognized that the statutes requiring payment

bonds on public contracts have purposes similar to the mechanics
lien statutes, but the statutes are not parallel.

Some persons

are protected under mechanics lien statutes who are not protected
under bonding statutes, and some are protected under bondingstatutes that are not protected under lien statutes.
Thus, to recognize that the mechanic's lien statutes and the
payment bond statutes have similar objectives, does not resolve
questions as to the coverage of statutory payment bonds.

As this

court said in Stanton Transportation Co, v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184,
341 P.2d 207, 210 (1959):
While it is true that our statutes are to be liberally
construed to give effect to their purpose and to promote
justice, it is equally true that they should not be distorted beyond the intent of the legislature. This principle
is particularly applicable in a situation of this kind where
a liability is imposed upon the property owner beyond what
he contracted to bear for the improvement of his property.
In order to impose upon him such additional burdens, the law
must clearly spell out the responsibility. Otherwise, the
entering into a contract for the improvement of one's property might open the door to unforeseeable risks for the
property owner.
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A similar approach was taken by the United States Supreme Court
in Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 64
S.Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed. 1164, 1167 (1944), in which it was recognized
that the Miller Act was entitled to a "liberal" construction to
protect laborers and materialmen, but with a caveat that "such a
salutary policy does not justify ignoring plain words of limitation and imposing wholesale liability on payment bonds."
In Graco Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 98 Utah Adv. Rpts. 28 (1988), this court noted that
the purpose of the mechanics' lien statute is to prevent -a windfall to property owners at the expense of equipment, material and
labor suppliers.

But a contractor is not in the same position as

the owner of property, and does not ordinarily have a "windfall"
if a supplier or laborer is not paid.

In the present case, for

instance, one of the established facts is that all of the amounts
that were earned by Gibbons and Reed's subcontractor were paid,
and if Western Coating's argument is accepted, the contractor
will have to pay twice.

It is common knowledge that surety com-

panies in writing payment bonds require indemnity from the contracting principal.

- 11 -

II.
Payment Bonds Furnished Pursuant to the Utah Procurement
Code are not Intended to Protect Third-Tier Materialmen,
Section 14-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, having been taken
almost verbatim from the Miller Act, MacEvoy and its progeny,
decided prior to adoption of 14-1-6, should be given considerable
weight in determining the intent of the Utah legislature.

If

this case had been governed by 14-1-6, the trial court would have
been correct in holding that Western Coating, a third-tier supplier, was not a beneficiary of the payment bond furnished to the
Department of Transportation.
In 1980, 14-1-6 was repealed when the Utah Procurement Code
was enacted, and although many of the provisions of 14-1-6 were
carried over into the Utah Procurement Code, there were some significant changes.
Section 14-1-6 provided:
Every claimant who has furnished labor and material in the
prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this act,
and who has not been paid in full therefor * * * shall have
the right to sue on such payment bond. * * *
Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Procurement Code provides:
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the following
bonds or securities shall be delivered to the state and
shall be binding upon the parties upon execution of the
contract:
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(a) A performance bond * * *; and
(b) A payment bond * * * for the protection of all
persons supplying labor and material to the contractor
or its subcontractors for the performance of the work
provided for in the contract.
(2)

[Provision for waiver of bond.]

(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided for in the
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished
under this section * * * may sue on the payment bond * * * .
Two years prior to Utah's adoption of its Procurement Code,
the United States Supreme Court had decided J. W. Bateson Co. v.
Board of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 873, 55 L.Ed.2d 50, 55
(1978).

In that case recovery under a payment bond had been

sought for an employee of a sub-subcontractor who had worked very
closely on the construction project, and the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals had held in favor of the
employee.

The United States Supreme Court reversed, saying:

As we observed in Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States,
ex rel. Calvin Tompkins Co., supra, Congress used the word
"subcontractor" in the Miller Act in accordance with the
"usage in the building trades." [Citations omitted.] In
the building trades,
a subcontractor is one who performs for and takes from
the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or
material requirements of the original contract. [Citation omitted.]
It thus appears that a contract with a prime contractor is a
prerequisite to being a "subcontractor." [Emphasis by the
court.]
- 13 -

Whatever else can be said about the meaning of the Utah Procurement Code, it cannot be said that it was intended to broaden
the class of persons protected by payment bonds furnished in connection with public contracts. The changes in language, however,
make it unnecessary to determine whether Section 14-1-6 protected
third-tier suppliers.

It may be presumed that the legislature

intended either to clarify the existing legislation relating to
payment bonds or to change it. See 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes,
S 166.

The new language indicates an intention on the part of

the legislature to adopt federal interpretations of the Miller
Act and to provide a cutoff point for contractor and surety
liability.
Under the necessary interpretation of the statute,
Continental-Hagen was not a "subcontractor", and Western Coating
cannot recover for materials furnished to Continental-Hagen.
CONCLUSION
Utah statutes requiring payment bonds for public projects,
do not benefit third-tier suppliers of material.

Inasmuch as the

claim of Western Coating against Gibbons and Reed Company and
American Insurance Company is based only on the payment bond
(R.38, par.10, R.60), Western Coating is not entitled to recover,
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and the s u m m a r y judgment g r a n t e d by the T h i r d D i s t r i c t
s h o u l d be

Court

affirmed.

Respectfully

Submitted,

BfyeiE Roe (Signed)
Bryce E . Roe
FABIAN & C L E N D E N I N , a
Professional Corporation
A t t o r n e y for G i b b o n s and R e e d
Company
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